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An Analysis of Factors Affecting
the Royal Air Force Contribution
to the Raid on Dieppe, 1942
D AV I D S T U B B S
Abstract : This paper seeks to explain the limited options available to Air
Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory when planning the Royal Air Force
(raf) portion of the combined operation raid on Dieppe in 1942. It proposes
that a number of constraining influences, some self-imposed, reduced the
air support options, so that only an air umbrella over the attacking forces
could be provided. It argues that these influences were a consequence
of the raf ’s cultural and conceptual environment, which perpetuated
Trenchardian notions of offensive spirit in raf doctrine, together with
the refusal to consider options to extend the range of its fighter aircraft.
The paper rejects claims that the raf ’s effort at Dieppe was the natural
evolution of combined operations doctrine and demonstrates that preemptive bombing of Dieppe was politically unacceptable.

T

he appalling losses suffered during the raid on Dieppe on 19
August 1942 sparked a controversy that induced many historians
to attempt to untangle the processes that led to its regeneration
and approval as Operation Jubilee after Operation Rutter, an earlier
incarnation of the same raid, had been cancelled. The egregious
political climber Vice-Admiral Louis Mountbatten, second cousin
once removed to Princess Elizabeth, commanded the raid after the
British prime minister, Winston Churchill, had elevated him three
steps in rank in March 1942, against the advice of Admiral of the
Fleet Sir Dudley Pound.1 Churchill had also supported Mountbatten’s

David Reynolds, In Command of History (New York: Random House, 2005), 341–
343, 347.
1  
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appointment to the post of Chief of Combined Operations (cco).
Robin Neillands showed that Churchill knew about the plans for the
raid on Dieppe because, on 17 August 1942, when in Cairo he had
asked for news of Operation Jubilee and was told that it had been
delayed by weather and would instead take place at first light on
19 August.2 Mountbatten probably assumed that he had been given
permission for the raid to go ahead on his own authority, as he had
for other raids, and that Churchill’s knowledge of the raid and his
interest in its outcome cemented this belief.3
In 1989 Brian Loring Villa claimed that Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles Portal, the Chief of the Air Staff, thought the raid on
Dieppe would act as ‘bait’ to provoke the routinely evasive Luftwaffe
into engaging in a large-scale air battle in the hope that the Royal
Air Force (r af) might inflict significant damage on the it.4 Villa
also suggested that Portal had deliberately engineered r af bomber
availability in order to deny the forces attacking Dieppe bomber
support, limiting the r af ’s air support options to the provision of air
cover. Villa argued that effectively synchronised bombing, together
with fighter cover, could have decisively affected the German defenders
ability to repel the assault. More recently, Timothy Balzer explained
how that the combined operations headquarters (cohq) deliberately
concocted the post raid narrative to minimise any negativity about
the disastrous outcome, manipulating the facts to promote the raid as
positively as possible.5 In this regard the r af element of the combined
headquarters produced questionable statistics to support its claims
that the air battle had been a great success.
Although Norman Franks’s seminal description of the raf’s
involvement over Dieppe, made reference to available cohq and air
files it was written in 1979, ten years before Villa’s book was published

2  
Robin Neillands, The Dieppe Raid: The Story of the Disastrous 1942 expedition
(London: Aurum, 2005), 114.
3  
P.J. Henshaw, “The Dieppe Raid: A Product of Misplaced Canadian Nationalism?”
Canadian Historical Review 77, no. 2 (June 1996), 250–266. T. Balzer, “‘In Case the
Raid Is Unsuccessful...’: Selling Dieppe to Canadians,” The Canadian Historical
Review 87, no. 3 (September 2006), 410–411.
4  
Brian Loring Villa, Unauthorised Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid
(Ontario: Oxford University Press, 1989), 158.
5  
Balzer, “‘In Case the Raid Is Unsuccessful,’” 411. CAB/65/31/18, Chief of Combined
Operations, 20 August 1942, Air Ministry to C-in-C Middle East, Most Secret Cypher
Telegram, TULIP 222 For Prime Minister from C.C.O, 20 August 1942, The Ministry
of Information, Combined Operations (London: HMSO, 1943), 135–136.
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and was insufficiently detailed to critically analyse whether raf kill
claims were deliberately manipulated to project an unduly positive
picture. By 1985 John Terraine had concluded that the post raid
declaration “Air Cooperation faultless” really meant little more than
that the ships and soldiers had not been molested from the air.6 John
Campbell’s excellent investigation into the documents surrounding the
Dieppe raid, published in 1993, neither verified nor refuted the validity
of the charges levelled against Portal by Villa, but noted that the raf’s
achievement of local air superiority was gained at considerable cost
because of the tactical advantages enjoyed by the Luftwaffe, which
had used its knowledge of the short range of raf fighters to devise
appropriate tactics.7 In 2012 Ross Mahoney countered Villa’s charges
by claiming that in pursuing its part in the Dieppe combined operation
the raf had simply endeavoured to achieve the role envisaged for it
in combined operations doctrine.8 The aim of this paper, therefore,
is to provide a fuller examination of the rationale for the limitations
of the raf’s support for Operation Jubilee in order to show that the
raf’s activities over Dieppe were neither the product of a deliberate
conspiracy by Portal to deny those attacking Dieppe bomber support,
nor the natural corollary of combined operations doctrine but, instead,
the consequence of a number of constraining influences under which
Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, the raf’s Force Commander
for the Operation, was working and the way these factors, many of
which were self-imposed, conspired to limit his options for air support.

tenchard’s doctrine of air superiority: willpower
preeminent
In 1942 most of the raf ’s senior leaders had been conditioned to
think of the effectiveness of air power through subjective assessments
of its effect on enemy morale and to prefer offensive over defensive
activities in the belief that heavy losses were a constituent part of
modern air warfare. The raf taught its senior officers to believe
J. Terraine, The Right of the Line (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985), 561.
J.P. Campbell, Dieppe Revisited: A Documentary Investigation (London: Frank
Cass, 1993), 189.
8  
R. Mahoney, ““The support afforded by the air force was faultless” The Royal Air
Force and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942,” Canadian Military History 21, no.
4 (Autumn 2012).
6  
7  
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that in a battle of willpower between air forces any unwillingness
to accept high losses might precipitate a morale collapse that would
percolate through its population and, eventually, to the government.
The lineage of raf doctrine to get to this point, as Neville Parton
has pointed out, began after 1923, five years after the raf became an
independent service because, until then, it had not committed itself
to a doctrine of war-winning independent action. Indeed, the raf ’s
first two major doctrinal publications, Confidential Document 22 and
its War Manual, Air Publication 1300, leaned heavily on Army and
Royal Navy doctrine for their content. These documents accepted
the Royal Navy’s interpretation of the term ‘aerial supremacy’ and
agreed on the importance of winning it over friendly forces while
denying it to the enemy.9 raf doctrine after 1923, however, contrived
a quite different meaning of air superiority that combined the raf ’s
newfound offensive doctrinal mantra with a belief that enemy morale
would be affected if its air forces suffered high loss rates and the
vulnerability of its population became abundantly apparent.
Air Chief-Marshal Hugh Trenchard, who began his second spell
as Chief of the Air Staff in 1919 and stayed in post until 1930,
believed ‘moral tenacity’ to be more valuable than ‘conceptual
dynamism.’10 Understandably, most senior r af officers who attended
staff college became aware of Trenchard’s predilection for the moral
over the conceptual and in a similar vein and tended to avoid objective
examination of the facts. Instead, they were encouraged to make
subjective assessments based on their own combat experience, which
was easy to do since their thinking was never seriously challenged.
For example, many First World War r af pilots disliked flying close
air support missions and believed that they resulted in excessively
disproportionate losses.11 It appears that no comparative analysis of

9  
Neville Parton, “The Development of Early RAF Doctrine,” Journal of Military
History 72, no. 4 (October 2008), 1155–1169.
10  
P.S. Meilinger, “Trenchard, Slessor and Royal Air Force Doctrine before World
War II” in P.S. Meilinger, ed., The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower
Theory (Air University Press, 2004), 47, 51.
11  
Alistair McCluskey, “The Battle of Amiens and the Development of British AirLand Battle, 1918–1945,” in Gary Sheffield and Peter Gray, eds., Changing War: The
British Army, The Hundred Days Campaign and the Birth of the Royal Air Force,
1918 (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 238, 240, 244. See also B. E. Smythies,
D.F.C. AP965: A selection of lectures and essays from the work of officers attending
the first course at the RAF Staff College 1922–1923 (London: Air Ministry, 1923),
80, 86. Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, Years of Combat (London: Collins, 1963), 240.
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the relative utility of such missions, based on the evidence, was ever
undertaken by those who attended r af staff college. Instead, students
were, it appears, minded to agree with Trenchard’s view that the
achievement of air superiority was a morale equation, influenced by
a willingness to maintain the offensive and accept the losses incurred
in the air-to-air variant of air combat.
Trenchard saw air warfare as a battle of willpower between
different teams, with each side trying to weaken the morale of the
other to a point where one side would be forced to cease offensive
action and concentrate instead on defence. This, in part, explains
his unremitting policy of offence during the First World War and his
willingness to accept the loss of large numbers of aircraft, pilots, and
observers as a regrettable necessity. In suggesting a way to mitigate
the horrendous losses, the more conceptually inclined Lieutenant
Colonel Hugh Dowding asked Trenchard to periodically consider
relieving squadrons from the front line. While Trenchard reluctantly
agreed he sensed in Dowding a lack of the necessary resolve to win
the battle of wills and thought him so “obsessed by the fear of further
casualties” that, shortly afterwards, he dispatched him back to
England.12 Thereafter, it appears that Trenchard harboured nagging
doubts about Dowding’s willingness to focus on offensive activities
and accept high losses as a matter of necessity.
“The French,” Trenchard claimed in 1923, “in a bombing duel
would probably squeal before we did … The nation that would stand
being bombed longest would win in the end.”13 Essentially, Trenchard
believed willpower, morale and air superiority were inextricably
linked and although he was notoriously inarticulate he managed to
explain his atypical definition of air superiority in these terms with
some clarity when addressing the Imperial Defence College in 1928:
Air superiority is gained in the course of the air attacks which are
delivered against the enemy’s vital centres [so that] the enemy’s
population and even their high command ... feel that they must defend
themselves against air attacks instead of counter attacking, then there

J. Ray, The Battle of Britain New Perspectives: Behind the scenes of the Great Air
War (London: Brockhampton Press, 1999), 19. Also in Vincent Orange, Dowding of
Fighter Command: Victor of the Battle of Britain (London: Grub Street, 2008) 35–36.
13  
The National Archives (TNA), Minutes of a Conference held in C.A.S.’s Room,
Air Ministry, on 19th July, 1923, at 11 a.m., 19 July 1923, AIR 5/416, 5.
12  
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will begin demands for air protection and aircraft will be detached from
the offensive to the defensive. … When one air force has in this way
thrown the other on to the defensive, it has gained air superiority.14

However, the same year the raf ’s War Manual, when defining
air superiority, appeared to place more emphasis on the physical
activities necessary to deny the enemy air force the opportunity to
interfere with offensive attacks. It described air superiority as:
A state of moral, physical and material superiority which enables its
possessor to conduct operations against an enemy, and at the same time
deprive the enemy of the ability to interfere effectively by the use of his
own air forces.15

Trenchard, however, was not convinced that offensive counter air
operations to target the enemy’s air force would be worthwhile:
It is not the Air Staff policy in a major war to concentrate and confine
the air offensive against the enemy air forces. The reason for this is
that that is an unprofitable way of using aircraft. It is exceedingly
difficult, if not impossible in a war against an air power to destroy the
air organisation of the enemy by air attacks upon his aerodromes.16

Only when Trenchard retired did his influence on r af doctrine
began to wane.17 In 1931 Wing Commander Trafford Leigh-Mallory
suggested two scenarios when attacks on enemy aerodromes might
be worthwhile. One of these was for a surprise attack to be carried
out to disorganise the enemy air force on the eve of some important
military operation.18 By 1940 the r af War Manual had matured
sufficiently to acknowledge the potential benefits of ‘destroying
aircraft and material on the ground and dislocating ground services’

TNA, Lord Trenchard, Chief of the Air Staff, Air Staff Memorandum, No. 43
S.28279: The War Aim of the Royal Air Force, in an address to the Imperial Defence
College, 1928, AIR 5/169, 5–6.
15  
Air Ministry, AP1300, Part I (1928), Chapter VII, 10.
16  
TNA, Lord Trenchard, Air Staff Memorandum, No. 43, AIR 5/169, 4.
17  
Group Captain Neville Parton, “Historic Book Review, Basic Principles of Air
Warfare, by ‘Squadron Leader,’” Air Power Review 10, no. 2, (2007), 94–98.
18  
Wing Commander T. Leigh-Mallory, “The Maintenance of Air Superiority in a
Land Campaign,” Royal Air Force Quarterly II, no. 2, (April 1931).
14  
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though the manual suggested that any advantage gained would likely
be short-lived.19 Unfortunately, the reality of the disasters suffered by
the r af after the Luftwaffe’s offensive counter air campaigns against
it in Flanders and Norway in 1940, and in Greece in 1941 failed to
percolate, as a lesson learned, into the collective consciousness of
fighter command’s commander-in-chief, Sir William Sholto Douglas
or his group commanders. Instead, of recognising the benefits of
supplementing any air-to-air fighting by disrupting, bombing, and
strafing enemy aircraft on the ground, Sholto Douglas persevered
with the notion that the best way to destroy the maximum number
of enemy aircraft was to induce the opposing air force into a large
attritional air battle.20

royal navy demands for air cover
When trying to understand the emphasis placed on protecting the
assaulting forces at Dieppe it is necessary to explain Royal Navy’s
volte-face with regard to the need for air support. Before the Second
World War the Royal Navy (rn ), the British army, and the raf
had interpreted the lessons of the 1936–1939 Spanish Civil War
along single service lines, to support their preconceived doctrinal
views and procurement priorities. The rn had long held the view
that aircraft would continue to be unable to sink capital ships and
in reviewing the evidence from Spain the deputy director of naval
intelligence opined that air attack against ships did not threaten
to sweep the rn from the seas and that ships manoeuvring at high
speed, concentrating their combined anti-aircraft (aa ) fire, would
fare well against low-level attack.21
However, the Norwegian campaign, in April and May 1940,
showed beyond any doubt the vulnerability of capital ships to air
attack when, ironically given the r n’s perspective on the vulnerability
of capital ships, the German navy’s light cruiser Konigsberg became
the first major warship to be sunk by r n dive bombers. Soon after
the anti-aircraft cruiser hms Curlew was bombed and sunk by the

AP1300, RAF War Manual, April 1940, Chapter VIII, paras. 23–24.
Sholto Douglas, Years of Command (London: Collins, 1966), 85-86
21  
Greg Kennedy, “The Royal Navy, Intelligence and the Spanish Civil War: Lessons in
Air Power, 1936–39,” Intelligence and National Security 20, no 2, (2005), 253, 255, 259.
19  
20  
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Luftwaffe near Narvik. In less than thirty days the reality of the air
threat to warships became clear to everyone, after the Royal Navy
lost six destroyers in the evacuation of the British Expeditionary
Forces from Dunkirk. Thereafter, Royal Navy sailors feared the sight
of aircraft to such an extent that they often ignored the requirement
to identify friend from foe before firing.22
Yet, instead of acknowledging its conceptual failure in ignoring the
threat from the air the r n turned the tables by blaming the r af for
not providing the protection it now acknowledged it needed. During
the Dunkirk evacuation Vice-Admiral Dover Bertram Ramsay, the
sailor responsible for the evacuation from Dunkirk, had signalled the
r af ’s fighter, bomber, and coastal commands to say “Your assistance
has been invaluable. It alone has given us a chance of success and I
trust you will be able to keep it up.”23 However, less than three weeks
later, on 18 June, when reporting to his superiors he expressed his
“disappointment and surprise at the seemingly puny efforts made to
provide air protection during the height of the operation,” and that
“rightly or wrongly full air protection was expected.”24 In a similar
vein Mountbatten’s experience as the Captain of hms Kelly influenced
his views of the use of air power when planning the Dieppe raid. On
23 May 1941 a Luftwaffe Ju87 ‘Stuka’ dive-bomber sank his ship
near Crete. Mountbatten, like Ramsay now believed that full air
support was necessary to enable successful maritime operations.25

the impact of the obsession with the big wing concept
Another constraint in deciding the type and level of air support
the raf would provide at Dieppe was can be traced to the legacy
of the ‘Big Wing’ dispute during the Battle of Britain in 1940. The
differences between Trenchard’s subjective, offense-focused doctrinal
Vincent Orange, Park: The Biography of Air Chief Marshall Sir Keith Park,
GCB, KBE, MC, DFC, DCL (London: Grub Street, 2010), 85, 88. H.R ‘Dizzy’
Allen, DFC,Battle for Britain (London: Arthur Baker, 1973), 61-63,71. Denis John
Vellacot Oral History IWM interview of Vellacott, a wireless operator/air gunner
with 30 Sqn, RAF in Middle East, Greece, Crete, 1940-1941. http://www.iwm.org.
uk/collections/item/object/80023018
23  
TNA, AIR 16/1170-3
24  
Ibid.
25  
Air Historical Branch (AHB), RAF Narrative, The Campaign in Crete, May 1941,
First Draft, 72.
22  
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view of air superiority, and an alternative objective definition which
reflected the suggestion made by Leigh-Mallory in his 1931 article:
“the attainment of operational freedom by our own aircraft, and
denying it to the enemy,” underpinned the arguments over the tactics
used by the commander-in-chief fighter command, Air Chief Marshal
Sir Hugh Dowding, and his Air Officer Commanding hq 11 Group
Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park in the Battle of Britain. Dowding’s
strategy was to deny the Germans the air superiority necessary for
them to conduct Operation Sealion, the invasion of England, whereas
his detractors in the Air Ministry, many of whom remained close to
Trenchard, thought he should be more offensively focused, and try
to inflict the maximum possible attrition on the Luftwaffe.26 This,
they believed, could be achieved by pitting as many raf fighters as
possible against the enemy in a large air-to-air battle.
The idea of committing wing-sized formations into an air battle
had been considered but rejected in August 1939, after the Air Ministry
had asked Dowding to investigate whether fighter formations larger
than squadron strength could be mustered to operate effectively as
a single formation. His response, drafted after Wing Commander G.
Lawson conducted air trials, concluded that large formations would
be cumbersome to keep together in formation and would break up
when attacked, and were therefore of little tactical value.27 Park
verified this assessment when he flew his Hurricane over Dunkirk
during the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force.28 Park
knew that the practical difficulties in getting disparate Spitfire and
Hurricane squadrons to work together would be exacerbated by their
incompatible high-frequency (hf) and very high frequency (vhf) radio
sets which hindered the ability of large formations to communicate
effectively. Moreover, to Park’s great irritation, upgrading radio sets
in raf fighters to a single standard proved to be an extraordinarily
slow process.
The main proponent of the ‘Big Wing’ concept at the tactical
level was Squadron Leader Douglas Bader who had rejoined the
r af in the winter of 1939 after being invalided out of the service in

H.C.T. Dowding, Twelve Legions of Angels (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode,
1941), 37.
27  
Orange, Park, 72.
28  
TNA, 15 August 1939, AIR 16/131. David Isby, Decisive Duel (London: Little
Brown, 2012), 112.
26  
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Bader in his Senior Term, 1930. Seated centre left, bottom row. [RAF Museum]

1933. Bader’s personality and self-belief was reinforced by the two
years he spent as a cadet at Royal Air Force college at Cranwell,
an institution that embodied Trenchard’s offensive thinking and
provided the main route to the higher appointments by means of the
permanent commissions granted after the completion of the course.29
Bader thrived at Cranwell, as it provided an ideal outlet for his
natural aggression and sporting talent.
Laddie Lucas, who later became his brother-in-law, believed
that Bader’s “indoctrination (at Cranwell) was complete, blind and
lasting.”30 Yet, in his first period of service, from 1928 to 1933, Bader
did not fly in an operational environment and on his return to the
r af in 1939 he knew next to nothing about the development of radar
detection or the workings of the air defence system created in his
absence. He was also unaware of the lessons learned during the Home
Defence Exercises, which sought to integrate the information derived
from radar and the observer corps in order to position modern fighter
aircraft to meet the threat. Moreover, instead of embracing the
opportunities enabled by the new technology, Bader disliked working
with the fighter controllers and preferred to ignore them or belittle

Chief of the Air Staff, An Outline Scheme for the Permanent Organization of the
Royal Air Force (London: HMSO, 1919), 5.
30  
Laddie Lucas, Flying Colours: The Epic Story of Douglas Bader (London:
Hutchinson, 1981), 27.
29  
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their input as interference.31 It is a conundrum, therefore, why after
Dunkirk Leigh-Mallory chose to believe Bader over Park in arguments
about the value of using fighters in larger formations.32 The seeds of
this volte-face were probably sown in October 1938 when Dowding
refused an idea by Leigh-Mallory to move the majority of fighter
squadrons to 12 Group’s area. Dowding thought that in proposing
the idea Leigh-Mallory had shown his “misconception of the basic
ideas of fighter defence.”33 The break in trust between the two men
may have been cemented in the debrief following a 1939 Air Defence
exercise when, in front of an assembled audience of officers, Dowding
told Leigh-Mallory “The trouble with you, Leigh-Mallory, is that you
sometimes cannot see further than the end of your little nose.”34
In 1940 Leigh-Mallory’s antipathy towards Dowding and his
exposure to the opinions of Douglas Bader appear to have led him to
revise his 1931 opinion on the methodology to achieve air superiority
or deny it to an opponent. He became the vociferous advocate of
the Big Wing idea, which neatly tallied with Trenchard’s offensive
thinking and the aspirations of the Air Ministry. Essentially, LeighMallory now agreed with those who believed that the r af could deny
the Luftwaffe air superiority and simultaneously inflict significant
losses on it. r af doctrine, as we have seen, maintained that such
losses would prove decisive in affecting the morale of the Luftwaffe
pilots and, ultimately, their commanders. So, while Park’s defensive
tactics were effective in frustrating the Luftwaffe fighter pilots who
bemoaned the r af ’s elusiveness35 many of the r af ’s senior leaders
believed they were little short of a reflection of Dowding’s preference
for the defensive over the offensive.36 Fighter pilots stationed with
Bader at r af Duxford in 12 Group’s area became mesmerised by
his ideas and were happy to ignore the orders given by the fighter
controllers when following him into 11 Group’s area looking for a

Michael. G. Burns, Bader: The Man and his Men (London: Arms and Armour,
1994), 85.
32  
Bill Newton Dunn, Big Wing (Shrewsbury: Airlife, 1992), 67.
33  
Stephen Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy (London: Aurum Press, 2009),
132–133.
34  
John Ray, The Battle of Britain: New Perspectives (Leicester: Brockhampton
Press, 2000), 18.
35  
John Frayn Turner, The Bader Tapes (Bourne End: Kensal Press, 1986), 93
36  
Ibid.
31  
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fight.37 The problem with this bravado was that the Home Chain radar
system only looked outwards and Bader’s decision to go where he
wished confused the observer corps into thinking his wing an enemy
formation, creating a potential “blue-on-blue” situation in today’s
language that greatly interfered with Park’s management of the air
battle. Incredibly, despite his years of experience at 12 Group, LeighMallory could not understand how Bader’s unauthorised incursions
caused identification problems and responded to Park’s complaints by
declaring they were “merely trying to get a bag.”38
Only much later, in their memoirs, did Bader’s previously
bewitched subordinates reveal their embarrassment at being so
naïve.39 Some, such as Flying Officer F.N. Brindsen, who like Bader
was stationed at r af Duxford, albeit on 19 Squadron, had harboured
doubts about Bader’s tactical ideas at the time. He would not have
seen Lawson’s trial report but he came to the same conclusion:
I was never a fan of Bader ‘Balbos’ considering them time wasting in
assembly and cumbersome in operation. In any case the formations
fragmented when battle was joined, so why waste precious time
assembling them?40

It was 1956 before Johnnie Johnson, the raf ’s top scoring fighter
pilot in the Second World War, another who flew with Bader from
raf Tangmere, described how Big Wings were unwieldy, difficult
to control and caused aircraft to get in each other’s way in a fight
so that only the leaders could bring their guns to bear. Johnson
also thought the very size of wing formations reduced the element
of surprise, as they could be seen so much earlier.41 At the time,
however, the narrative suggested by Leigh-Mallory incorporated 12
Group’s extraordinarily high kill claims and appeared to prove the

Ray, The Battle of Britain, 111–112. Sebastian Cox, Sholto Douglas and Leigh
Mallory, John Jupp, eds., Air Force Leadership: Changing Culture (Sleaford, Royal
Air Force Leadership Centre, 2007), 47–48.
38  
Sholto Douglas, Years of Command, 90. John Ray, The Battle of Britain, 161.
39  
Hugh Dundas, Flying Start (London: Penguin, 1990), 61–62.
40  
Derek Palmer, Fighter Squadron (Torquay: Devonshire Press, 1991), 189.
41  
Johnnie Johnson, Big Wing, 60–61.
37  
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tactics were more effective than those being used in 11 Group.42
Although Park suspected that the figures were based on suspiciously
gross false accounting, the ‘evidence’ correlated with the perception
by many in the Air Ministry, that the strategy defined by Dowding
and employed by Park was overly defensive. In contrast LeighMallory’s claims had a magnetic effect on those who wished to
remove Dowding and Park and accorded with Trenchard’s opinion
that it was essential to have resolve and spirit necessary to accept a
high number of casualties in order to destroy enough enemy aircraft
to achieve air superiority.
Around this time Sholto Douglas began a daily telephone
dialogue with Leigh-Mallory to discuss Park’s tactical conduct of
the battle.43 In the minds of many senior r af officers at the Air
Ministry, including Air Marshal Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferté, Air
Commodore John Slessor, Air Commodore Donald Stevenson and
Group Captain Henry Crowe the Big Wing narrative had won the
argument: for them Dowding and Park had been mismanaging the
battle. In fact, Dowding and Park became so frustrated with the
inability of other senior r af officers to appreciate the validity of their
tactics, or to understand the importance of denying the Luftwaffe air
superiority, that on 7 September 1940 they decided to lecture Sholto
Douglas about the realities of air defence as though he was a rather
naïve fool.44
Although he had retired ten years earlier Trenchard chose to
become involved with those supporting Sholto Douglas and he used
his influence over his numerous protégés in the military and political
spheres to help relieve Dowding and Park of their jobs.45 Sholto
Douglas’s revenge for being patronised was achieved when he was
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given Dowding’s job. The longer term consequence of these changes
was the conceptual commitment, by Sholto Douglas and Leigh-Mallory,
to the idea of using Big Wings of fighters in offensive fighter sweeps of
northern France, known as ‘Rhubarbs’, and in similar ‘Circus’ missions
which combined a mixture of bombers and fighters in an attempt to
lure the Luftwaffe fighters into a battle of attrition. The main reason
for persevering with these tactics can be explained by the mistaken
belief in the raf’s pilots kill claims, which although less impressive
in ratio terms than those claimed during Big Wing operations in the
Battle of Britain, continued to suggest a good return.

the emphasis on kill claims
One of the main difficulties in accurately determining how well the
raf performed at Dieppe is that before the raid the primary aim had
been to focus on the relative number of aircraft shot down by either
side. Only after the raid did the narrative alter to claim that main
focus of the raf support had been to keep the Luftwaffe away from
the battle area so that the troops on the ground were not harassed or
molested by enemy air attacks; that the relative number of aircraft
lost was not really that important.46 The change in this narrative, it
should be noted, began the day after the raid when the horrendously
high Canadian casualties became apparent. Air Chief Marshal Sir
Charles Portal, the Chief of the Air Staff, sought to distance himself
from the idea that the raf had used the Dieppe raid to induce a
large air-to-air battle with the Luftwaffe.47 But in 1941 and 1942, the
relative number of Luftwaffe aircraft reported destroyed or damaged
by the raf was a fundamental constituent of assessments made
about the effectiveness of the air campaign because the responsible
raf senior officers had become conditioned to believe they were
important, as had their political masters. Certainly, that is where
their attention was focused in the planning for the raid.
Sholto Douglas had a conceptual aversion to the idea that longrange fighters should escort bombers, and had vehemently argued

Sholto Douglas, Years of Command, 175.
CAB/65/31/18, W.M. (42) 115TH Conclusions, Minute 1, Confidential Annex,
20th August, 1942 6.0 pm, 20 August 1942.
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A Spitfire MkIIa with a 40 gallon single port wing fixed fuel tank. [http://s412.photobucket.com/
user/ruspren/media/ruspren001/IMG_0703_zpsa8b0b786.jpg.html]

against them since 1937.48 So, in November 1940 when the Air Ministry
directed fighter command to conduct offensive missions over France
his short-range Spitfire’s were unable to penetrate very far into France.
An attempt was made to provide fifty Spitfire Mk IIa squadrons
with forty gallons of additional fuel in a single fixed-wing tank but
although the flight trials assessed the Mk IIa model “satisfactory as
a fighter” the aircraft proved unpopular with pilots who considered
it cumbersome and vulnerable because of its reduced maximum
speed and climbing performance, which together with worries about
belly landings led the pilots to believe that they were at a significant
disadvantage to the Luftwaffe fighters.49 Portal, no doubt heavily
influenced by Sholto Douglas’s views on long-range fighters, advised
Prime Minister Winston Churchill that it was unfair to expect r af
pilots to fight at a disadvantage, that long-range fighters could never
hold their own against short-range fighters and were only suitable for
employment where short-range fighters would not oppose them. So,
until late 1943, Spitfire fighters were constrained to the narrow part

TNA, Air Fighting Committee Minutes, 9 June 1937, AIR 20/3605.
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Source: UK Crown Copyright. Courtesy of AHB(RAF)

of the French coast that they could reach and patrol for relatively
short periods of time.50
When fighter sweeps over France began in late 1940 the
prime minister, Winston Churchill, was keenly interested in the
effectiveness of these operations, particularly if anything went wrong.
On 9 February 1941, Churchill asked Portal to explain why eight
r af fighters had been lost for claims of only two enemy destroyed
and one probably lost on a ‘sweep’ over France four days earlier.
Portal explained that “a serious breakdown between the Fighter and
Bomber Commands had occurred and that the bombers had arrived
at the rendezvous point late causing the various waves of fighters to
be thrown out of gear.”51 Squadron Leader Kenneth Cross noted how
the Germans exploited the Spitfire’s lack of range by sequencing their
attacks to coincide with the Spitfire’s most vulnerable period of the
sortie: at the end of the time provisioned over France when the pilot’s
ability to offer air combat was compromised by the limited amount
of fuel at his disposal.52 The apparent futility of these operations was
not lost on many of the pilots taking part. Nevertheless, some of the
wing leaders, including Wing Commander Douglas Bader, saw these
operations as an opportunity to increase their personal ‘score’ of
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enemy aircraft and any questioning as to the military value of Circus
operations by rank and file pilots was quickly quelled; a response
that typified the perception of Bader as an insensitive bully with a
fondness for self-promotion by many of those who worked with him.53
At fighter command the utility of continuing fighter sweeps or
Circus operations was rarely questioned, but the exceptions to this
norm were prescient. On 7 March 1941 none other than Sir Douglas
Evill, Sholto Douglas’s senior air staff officer, articulated his doubts
about their effectiveness.54 Shortly afterwards, in one of LeighMallory’s regular conferences at r af Northolt through which he gained
a more detailed tactical understanding of what was happening, Wing
Commander John Kent, rcaf, vociferously explained the impact of
the Spitfire’s short flying radius had on his pilots’ morale and fighting
spirit.55 In June 1941 Kent’s interjection may have influenced LeighMallory to tell Sholto Douglas about his high fighter casualty rates
and question whether the wing sweep operations were paying off.56
The problem he had was that in accepting the kill claims made during
these operations wa‘that the corollary of believing and promoting
the kill claims made during these operations was that it persuaded
senior RAF officers that wing tactics were working and the RAF
was extracting at least an equal toll on Luftwaffe fighters. Gradually,
however, even amongst the most blinkered optimists, there was a
dawning realisation that something was amiss.57 Squadron Leader
Billy Burton, the officer commanding 616 Squadron, in Bader’s wing
at Tangmere, sensed this anxiety and claimed that when Bader
was shot down in August 1941 the wing was in a state of mutiny
brought on by his reckless leading in an effort to increase his own
score.58Bader, of course, was so admired by Leigh-Mallory and Sholto
Douglas that arrangements to send him another prosthetic leg were
coordinated with the Germans when reports that one of his prosthetic
legs had been lost when he was shot down were received. An angry
Martin Francis, The Flyer: British Culture and the Royal Air Force 1939–1945
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 133–134. Cross, Straight and Level, 123.
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Churchill accused Sholto Douglas of fraternising with the enemy59 to
which a signal claiming that seven Luftwaffe fighters had been shot
down during Circus 81, the spare leg delivery mission, was quickly
produced as evidence to suggest otherwise. Clearly, the prime minister
and senior r af officers thought relative number of aircraft shot down
or destroyed was the appropriate metric by which to assess the utility
of such operations.
Moves to have Circus operations suspended were quashed when
Portal reminded Sholto Douglas of the need to maintain pressure
on the Germans in the west in order to relieve the pressure on the
Russians in the east. So, rather than reducing the sweeps, now
understood to cause high losses amongst r af pilots to questionable
effect, Sholto Douglas chose to increase them for reasons of grand
strategy. Yet concern over the high casualty rates continued and
after nine pilots were lost in Circus 13, on 18 June 1941, Portal,
who probably wanted to have answers ready for Churchill, asked for
details of what had happened. Leigh-Mallory feared that he might be
blamed for the losses but Portal assured Sholto Douglas that he need
not have worried and was disturbed that Leigh-Mallory thought that
he might be open to criticism.60
Throughout these exchanges the fundamental dynamics of these
operations had not changed. The Spitfire still lacked the necessary
range to conduct effective operations over France, or indeed for that
matter Germany, and the pilots disliked operating over sea far away
from their airfields. Moreover, the real losses suffered were much
worse than feared. Nevertheless, when Leigh-Mallory became aware
that Portal and Churchill wanted the Circus operations to continue,
his tendency to identify his own interests with those holding power
again came to the fore and by September 1941 he had set aside his
worries about the losses. Instead, he became enthused with the idea
that if only five percent of heavy bombers were employed on regular
Circus operations it might be possible to induce a large number of
Luftwaffe fighters into a fight and cause a heavy toll of their fighter
pilots.61 Air Vice-Marshal Donald Stevenson, however, derided the
idea and thought Leigh-Mallory was trying to fight “the same kind of
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Signal message relating to the parachute
dropping of a replacement artificial leg
over St. Omer, 19 August 1941. [RAF
Museum]

battle as the Luftwaffe fought in 1940 and since he was using similar
equipment, must not be surprised if the results are unfavourable.”62
Eventually, given the effect r af fighter losses were having on the
morale of its pilots, the Air Ministry conveniently chose to conclude
that the r af and Luftwaffe had fought themselves to a stalemate and
that the chief aim of the offensive, to destroy a significant number of
German fighters, had been realised. By October 1941 it was decided
to restrict offensive missions by fighter command aircraft.63 Only
much later did Sholto Douglas lament the loss of 426 pilots killed,
missing, or taken prisoner in 1941, a greater number than the r af
lost in the whole of the Battle of Britain.64
Given the scale of the r af losses in the 1941 Circus campaign,
the concept of manufacturing air battles to write down the Luftwaffe
had become a political/strategic decision rather than an operational/
military one. In this context, the British saw the German decision
of March 1942 to transfer forty of their fighter aircraft from the
Brest and Pas de Calais areas to reinforce fighter strength in Norway

Ibid., Letters Stevenson to C-in-C Bomber Command—Air Marshal Sir Richard
Pierse 10 September 1941 and to Air Vice-Marshal Sir John Slessor, 14 September 1941.
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and Denmark and protect their bombers attacking British convoys
heading north, as an opportunity to resume Circus operations and
apply pressure on the Luftwaffe.65 Yet, in 1942 the Spitfire was still
a short-range fighter and Dieppe was very close to the edge of its
range envelope, where it was especially vulnerable. After assessing
the utility of conducting wing-sized fighter sweeps, Churchill
concluded that a renewed campaign would be worthwhile but only if
fighter command lost ‘plane for plane’ with the Luftwaffe.66 Fighter
Command was instructed to resume its daylight Circus operations
“with the object of inducing German fighters to accept combat with
our own covering fighter forces” in order to “inflict casualties in the
fighting whilst the additional flying which is forced upon the enemy
will increase normal wastage.”67 The requirement was crystal clear:
attack targets to destroy as many Luftwaffe fighters as possible
while, given Churchill’s concern about relative losses, devise tactics
to minimise disproportionate r af losses.
The importance of the keeping up the offensive in the west
was underlined when on 30 April 1942 Air Vice-Marshal Norman
Bottomley, the deputy Chief of the Air Staff at the Air Ministry,
directed fighter command to intensify day fighter activity as its
first priority.68 Yet, less than seven weeks later the superiority
of the new Luftwaffe fighter, the fw 190, over the Spitfire v had
become abundantly apparent and Bottomley, now assistant Chief of
the Air Staff (Operations), directed fighter command to restrain its
‘sweeps’ and deeper penetrations into France until the new Spitfire
ix or Typhoon fighters came on line in sufficient numbers to tilt the
balance back in the r af ’s favour.69
Given this background, any offensive counter air campaign
to gain air superiority and destroy or reduce the Luftwaffe over
Dieppe would require imaginative planning, coordination, and
synchronisation. During the planning for the Dieppe raid, LeighMallory received the intelligence assessment on the scale of the threat
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posed by the Luftwaffe and he would have been acutely aware of the
likely response to the ‘bait’ created by the largely Canadian assault
on Dieppe. Furthermore, Leigh-Mallory’s evolving awareness of the
r af ’s failure to secure air superiority over northern France influenced
his judgement that the very best he could achieve was a temporary
degree of air superiority sufficient to enable the raid and protect the
ships, and this explains his fears that such an operation would prove
expensive in terms of aircraft and pilots. In trying to do all that was
expected of him by his combined operations colleagues he would have
realised that the majority of his Spitfires would have to operate at a
slight tactical disadvantage, something his pilots had always wished
to avoid.
It is interesting to speculate whether or not Bottomley’s directive
of 13 June had reached Leigh-Mallory by 15 June, when he supported
the intention to remount Rutter as Jubilee, but it certainly solidified
his worries that the r af might lose a significant number of aircraft
and pilots over Dieppe.70 Two weeks later, after pondering the
worst-case consequences, he decided to voice his concerns to Sholto
Douglas, effectively admitting that the fighter sweep policy had again
failed to achieve the temporary air superiority intended as it had not
extracted the toll of the Luftwaffe aircraft desired. In planning for
the raid on Dieppe he thought:
the casualties will, I expect, be relatively high and we can, I suggest,
be well satisfied if our losses do not exceed, say 60 to 70 pilots, and 120
aircraft in the squadrons providing fighter cover … because we cannot
claim to have attained air superiority in North West France … once our
plan is clear to the enemy, the initiative is his, and he can choose his
moment to concentrate his forces.71

In answering this perceptive and reasoned analysis Sholto
Douglas, no doubt mindful of the political imperative, questioned
Leigh-Mallory’s determination to see things through and, in a
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typically Trenchardian retort, showed no intention of doing anything
to change the course of events:
I do not know however quite what you expect me to do about it. I
certainly do not propose to call the operation off. If I may say so,
I think you are worrying too much about these possible casualties.
Unfortunately, one cannot often win a battle without considerable
casualties, however much one would like to do so.72

The problem, of course, was that no one really knew the toll of
German aircraft the RAF had really bachieved and in trying to meet
Churchill’s ‘plane for plane’ metric, a question mark must be raised
over fighter command’s lethargy in cross-correlating the pilots kill
claim reports with intelligence derived from ‘Y’ Service intercepts and
ultra-derived information to better determine the actual losses. Overt
scepticism and constructive dissent appear to have been entirely absent;
instead blind faith in the numbers claimed prevailed. The evidence
now shows that Leigh-Mallory’s doubts were fully justified and the
campaign before August 1942 had been an operational and tactical
disaster. Even if the raf fighter pilots had shot down the 197 Luftwaffe
aircraft they claimed from March to June 1942 they would have failed
to meet the ‘plane for plane’ target set by Churchill because the raf
lost 259 aircraft during the same period. The actual ratio of losses was
much worse: the Luftwaffe only lost 58 aircraft.73

an raf plan limited to what it could do
As the date of the Dieppe raid approached it was clear that the
majority of the raf fighters would be at a qualitative disadvantage
to the Luftwaffe’s fw 190 fighters but they did have the benefit
of greater numbers and, as Richard Overy and Paul Kennedy
have suggested, given the qualitative advantages of one aircraft
over another were quite small the relative numbers of aircraft
available to each side often made the difference to the outcome of

TNA. Sholto Douglas to Leigh-Mallory, 30 June 1942. AIR 16/760.
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the air war.74 In May 1940 the raf allocated approximately 200
fighters to the Dunkirk operation. Facing them the Luftwaffe had
up 550 Luftwaffe fighters and 300 assorted bombers.75At Dieppe
the balance was reversed, forty-eight of the seventy mainly raf
squadrons involved were fighters, almost 600 aircraft. Of these less
than fifty were the Spitfire ix model, which was superior to the fw
190. Arranged against them British Intelligence assessed that the
Luftwaffe had only 260 first-line fighters available between Texel
and Brest (only 225 were actually serviceable) and that only 120
of these, operating from Abbeville, would be able to provide the
initial fighter opposition. British Intelligence also estimated that the
Luftwaffe had 220 bombers in the west (the actual figure was 175).76
Moreover, the attackers would benefit from the advantage of having
tactical surprise and be mainly focused on achieving temporary air
superiority over the raiding naval and land forces during the short
period of the assault and withdrawal.77 Twenty-four b -17 Flying
Fortresses from the United States Army Air Force (usaaf ) Eighth
Air Force, flying only their second operational mission, were tasked
to attack the Luftwaffe airfield at Abbeville, escorted by the four
Spitfire ix squadrons.78 Presumably, the timing of this attack was
delayed in order to retain the element of surprise at Dieppe but
this meant that the offensive counter air bombing was scheduled
to coincide with the withdrawal of the attacking forces. This, of
course, was very different to what Leigh-Mallory had proposed in
1931 when he suggested the launching of surprise attacks on the eve
of important military operations.
Villa believed that the decision to exclude bombing from the
Jubilee raid plan was one of the major reasons for its failure, but
in 1942 bombing of French towns to provide fire support to ground
troops was rejected by the politicians. French representatives had
repeatedly complained to the British about the r af ’s bombing of
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coastal towns in 1940 and 1941; these killed 1,650 and injured 2,311
civilians. In May 1941 the mayors of four coastal towns, including
Dieppe, protested through the United States Legation at Vichy about
heavy bombing of residential areas and the British Foreign Secretary
Anthony Eden asked the Air Ministry to take every care to minimise
damage to civilian property and civilian casualties.79 In April 1942
r af bombing of the Renault works at Billancourt on the outskirts of
Paris killed 367 French civilians, injured another 341 and made 9,250
people homeless. The high casualty toll presented the Germans with
a profitable propaganda story and caused the British war Cabinet to
worry how killing French civilians might affect the level of support
the Allies could expect to receive from the French population they
were hoping to liberate. So intense was the nervousness about such
attacks that in May 1942 a raid on the Schneider armaments and
locomotive works at Le Creusot was cancelled, though this decision
was eventually reversed in July 1942. When, in June 1942, Air ChiefMarshal Philip Joubert de la Ferté, air operations commander-inchief coastal command, proposed the bombing of German submarine
pens in French coastal towns, to mitigate the devastating effects of
the German submarine attacks on Allied shipping, the secretary of
state for air, Sir Archibald Sinclair, thought the idea so odious that he
declared that the proposed risks to civilian casualties were politically
unacceptable:
“… it would be useless to ask the Cabinet to embark on a policy of
ruthless attacks on French towns.” The air staff concluded “that the
desired military object could not be achieved by the form of attack.”80

It is clear, therefore, that at the time of the planning for the raid on
Dieppe there was no political appetite to sanction any bombing that
might cause significant French civilian casualties, and even if there
had been it would have required a very robust and verifiable audit
trail to authorise it; something notably absent from the Dieppe raid’s
approval process. Villa’s idea that an r af conspiracy sought to deny
bombing support to the Dieppe raid ignores the political reluctance
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to employ such methods in mid-1942. Moreover, Air Marshal Arthur
Harris’s objection to the bombing of Dieppe, on the grounds that
his bombers would need the protection of the night, was based on
the assumption that r af fighters would be unable to provide the
protection they would need, which was hardly a vote of confidence
for the narrative of repeated success over France painted by Fighter
Command. Instead, Harris preferred to let the usaaf bombers play a
role at Dieppe in accordance with their daylight tactics.
By 9:30 a.m., when the order to evacuate Dieppe had been made,
it was obvious that the raid had failed.81 At that time the Luftwaffe
had only managed to get twenty to thirty aircraft on patrol at any
one time and despite Luftwaffe attempts to commit all of its bombers
against the attackers it was 10:00 a.m., thirty minutes after the decision
to evacuate, before the first two of these arrived on the scene. Only
another 125 Luftwaffe bomber sorties were launched during the rest
of the day. In stark contrast to the 945 sorties flown by the Luftwaffe
the raf flew 2,604 to provide air cover. The relative number of aircraft
committed to the air battle and the number of missions flown are
significant because raf offensive doctrine sought to overwhelm the
defenders and because of the importance placed by the prime minister
on the relative numbers of aircraft lost. Therefore, a better metric of
the raf performance and effectiveness at Dieppe would be to assess
how well it performed against the Luftwaffe aircraft ranged against it
as well as by its ability to deliver and sustain an air umbrella over the
rn and beachhead.

suboptimal command and control
With understandable logic, Leigh-Mallory and Mountbatten thought
the operations bunker at hq 11 Group would be the best place to
monitor the progress of the Dieppe raid as they would be able to see
the air plots on the operations room table and correlate these with
the reports from the rn and army commanders aboard hms Calpe
with which their headquarter was expected to be in continuous radio
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contract.82 This apparently rational decision naively adjudged the
technical and practical difficulties of squeezing the communications
required for a major joint force headquarters operation into a single
service headquarters relatively easy to manage. Though the post
Dieppe pamphlet published by the Ministry of Information claimed
that “Leigh-Mallory … could see with great clarity every move of the
battle as it took place before him on a great map” and “knew exactly
what was happening and was able to anticipate every move of the
enemy in the air” the reality was that the Dieppe raid was much
bigger than anything Leigh-Mallory had handled in his time at 11
Group.83 He struggled to keep abreast of what was happening when
communications broke down, the landings went awry the amount
of data coming into the headquarters began to overwhelm his staff.
It did not help that Major-General John Roberts, who commanded
the landing forces from hms Calpe, was unable to observe what
was happening because smoke in the vicinity of the assault and
the screen protecting the Royal Navy warships obscured his view.
Communications breakdown reduced Roberts’s understanding of
what was happening on the beaches, which in turn made it difficult
for him to keep Mountbatten informed about what was going on so
he, in turn, could direct operations accordingly. Moreover, outgoing
messages from Uxbridge to hms Calpe did not always reach the
military commander afloat. This made it necessary for Roberts to
repeat his requests for close support, which caused excessive delay
in matching aircraft to targets. Ultimately, the confusion over which
unit had control of the aircraft, at Uxbridge, resulted in missed
opportunities to relieve the pressure on those fighting on the ground.84
At 11 Group headquarters it proved impossible to cross-correlate
Morse code intercepts with the voluminous voice traffic, or to relate
intercepted German voice traffic to the operational situation. The
tactical intelligence picture became so confused that it failed to detect
Luftwaffe fighters coming from neighbouring sectors to reinforce the
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Group Captain Harry Broadhurst. [UK Crown Copyright. Courtesy of AHB(RAF)]

Dieppe area.85 This resulted in Leigh-Mallory’s wings being poorly
positioned to intercept the incoming attacks. The experienced raf
fighter ace Johnnie Johnson led four sorties over Dieppe but his
wing was never able to establish communications with hms Calpe,
to receive direction and guidance from the raf controllers. Little
wonder Johnson found the battle confusing.86 To gauge what was
really happening in the air battle over Dieppe, Leigh-Mallory began
to rely on the reports made by Group Captain Harry Broadhurst,
his deputy senior air staff officer, who also flew 4 sorties over Dieppe
in his Spitfire before landing and calling by telephone to explain
what he had seen of the battle. Around 9:00 a.m., at Biggin Hill,
Broadhurst, like Lawson and Park earlier, concluded the wing
operations were unwieldy. He advised Leigh-Mallory that Spitfire
ix’s should patrol in pairs between Le Treport in order to intercept
Luftwaffe fw 190 fighters that were avoiding the wing-sized patrols.
Air battle management, using the integrated air defence system, had
broken down: it was as if the development of radar, radiotelephony,
and signals intelligence had never happened.

Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, 703.
Johnnie Johnson, Wing Leader (London: David & Charles, 1974), 146. IWM
Interview, Johnson, James Edgar ‘Johnnie’. Available at http://www.iwm.org.uk/
collections/item/object/80010127 reel 2, 07:07 to 09:20
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Things got so bad that less than half an hour after the order
to evacuate had been given Leigh-Mallory was obliged to ask hms
Calpe for a situation report. The response was: “Situation too
obscure to give useful report. Air co-operation faultless. Enemy
air opposition now increasing. Have you any questions?” Although
this was a subjective assessment made in the heat of the battle it
was widely and frequently reported in its shortened version “Air
co-operation faultless” to suggest the raf’s performance had been
nothing less than magnificent. The full report tells an altogether
different story: that no clear understanding of what was happening
on the beaches existed, the battle was still raging, and the outcome
was still far from decided. The raf had, so far, done what was
expected of it in delivering air cover for the assaulting forces.
Although Leigh-Mallory’s post-raid report obliquely acknowledged
the communication problems described by an air controller on board
hms Calpe, the value of having a forward air controller on one of
the hq ships did not subsequently appear in the Jubilee Lessons
Learned even though this oversight had been a major cause of the
coordination difficulties encountered.87

analysis
It is clear that whatever the apparent similarities between the raf ’s
support to the raid on Dieppe and the natural evolution of combined
operations doctrine, there were a number of self-imposed factors
that limited the options available to Leigh-Mallory.
Trenchard’s doctrine of offensive action, with its emphasis on
attacking enemy morale had never been seriously challenged by any of
his subordinates who reached high rank; they believed the validity of
the theory. Consequently, in a desire to rid Fighter Command of what
was perceived to be overly defensive tactics, the r af adopted Big Wing
tactics in an attempt to inflict high losses on its Luftwaffe opponent.
By then, however, with the Battle of Britain won, the dynamics of
the ensuing air battle had changed and the Luftwaffe adopted tactics
broadly similar to those employed by Fighter Command in order to
Greenhous et al., The Crucible of War, 1939–1945, Volume 3:The Official History
of the Royal Canadian Air Force (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994),
240–242. Campbell, Dieppe Revisited, 217.
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remain elusive whilst denying the air superiority the r af craved over
France. Consequently, instead of significantly reducing the Luftwaffe
and achieving temporary air superiority over France from late 1940
onwards the r af ’s pilots began to suffer from an erosion of confidence
and morale when they realised that their activities were failing to
yield the results required. The irony, therefore, was that the tactics
defined by Dowding and employed by Park were highly effective in
achieving the desired Trenchardian outcome on the enemy’s fighting
morale. Subsequently, r af freedom of action was constrained by its
adherence to Big Wing offensive tactics because of a conspiracy of
optimism created by naïve faith in the kill claims made by its pilots.88
This, in turn, was galvanised by Churchill’s interest in the relative
losses suffered by the r af and Luftwaffe.
Fighter command’s post-Dieppe raid kill claims passed on to
Mountbatten and Churchill maintained that 95 Luftwaffe aircraft
had been destroyed, thirty-eight probably destroyed and 140
damaged, for the loss of ninety-eight raf aircraft.89 After the raid
on Dieppe, Leigh-Mallory was so wedded to belief in his pilots’
kill claims that he chose to think the Germans had deliberately
concealed their losses to higher authorities. Air Commodore John
Whitworth Jones, fighter command’s director of fighter operations,
was so similarly convinced that the real Luftwaffe losses had been
underestimated that he disregarded the objective evidence from
pilots’ combat reports, gun cameras and Y service intercepts of
Luftwaffe bomber call-signs because it suggested the Luftwaffe had
only lost ninety-two aircraft. Indeed, Leigh-Mallory chose to latch
on to a figure that tallied with his subjective assessment of what
had happened and was apt to quote Luftwaffe losses of 170 aircraft,
which he gleaned from an obscure Vichy source, as proof of his
success to Churchill and to the press.90
Over Dieppe on 19 August 1942 the Luftwaffe actually lost
forty-eight aircraft,91 the raf 106.92 On first sight these figures
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appear to show a very poor return against the claims made at the time
but they ought to be viewed in the context of the actual figures for the
previous four months of Circus operations. Looked at this way the
raf’s performance at Dieppe was actually a marked improvement.
Unfortunately, Leigh-Mallory’s willingness to accept the kill claims
made by raf fighter pilots at Dieppe made him think he had stumbled
on a formula to achieve the air superiority required for the invasion
later planned in Normandy and in the interim he attempted to get
cohq to repeat similar raids. The Americans, unbound by dubious
doctrine or closed minds with regard to long-range fighters, read
events very differently. They concluded that large numbers of fighters
fitted with long-range fuel tanks would reduce any tactical advantage
provided by Luftwaffe radar and would help the usaaf to overwhelm
and defeat the Luftwaffe. Of course, that is what they did.
The final factor influencing Leigh-Mallory in the planning for
Dieppe was the Royal Navy’s grudging acceptance that ships were
vulnerable to air attack, which together with the army’s desire for
an air umbrella and the r af ’s conceptual aversion to ground attack
and offensive counter air missions constrained the options for LeighMallory to use his short-range fighters. Consequently, Leigh-Mallory’s
plan was simple and the tactics used at Dieppe in 1942 were scaled to
overwhelm well-organised Luftwaffe defences.
However, the method to achieve Leigh-Mallory’s objectives was
compromised by the suboptimal command, control and communication
arrangements, which struggled to cope with the deluge of information
received. Leigh-Mallory lost control of the air battle as Johnson’s
confused and free ranging wing missions clearly demonstrated. That
said, the timely input of Broadhurst assuaged the damage and in
relative terms Leigh-Mallory’s fighters had done significantly better
than during the previous three months of Circus operations. For him,
despite the hybrid operational focus and its multifarious aims and
objectives, Dieppe was a relative success, albeit an expensive one.
Leigh-Mallory had hoped that his plan would draw the Luftwaffe
away from its clever defensive strategy into fighting a larger air battle
where the odds were evened out, and to a certain degree this is what
happened. Had Leigh-Mallory stood by his 1931 interpretation of air
superiority, challenged Sholto Douglas’s views on long-range fighters
and been more skeptical about the kill claims made by his fighter
pilots he may have been able to do more than provide an air umbrella
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for the assaulting forces at Dieppe even though that might not have
earned the accolade of providing ‘faultless support.’
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